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Abstract: This research explores the failure of competitively tendered projects in the UK construc-
tion industry to procure the most suited contractor(s) to conduct the works. Such work may have 
equal relevance for other developed nations globally. This research seeks to teach clients and their 
representatives that “lowest price” does not mean “best value”, by presenting a case study of a suc-
cessfully negotiated tender undertaken by a small-to-medium enterprise (SME) contractor; SME 
studies are relatively scant in academic literature. By applying the “lessons learnt” principle, this 
study seeks to improve future practice through the development of a novel alternative procurement 
option (i.e., negotiation). A mixed philosophical stance combining interpretivism and pragmatism 
was used—interpretivism to critically review literature in order to form the basis of inductive re-
search to discuss negotiation as a viable procurement route, and pragmatism to analyse perceptions 
of tendering and procurement. The methods used follow a three-stage waterfall process including: 
(1) literature review and pilot study; (2) quantitative analysis of case study data; and (3) qualitative 
data collection via a focus group. Our research underscores the need to advise clients and their 
representatives of the importance of understanding the scope of works allowed within a tender 
submission before discounting it based solely on price. In addition, we highlight the failings of com-
petitive tendering, which results in increased costs and project duration once the works commence 
on site. These findings provide new contemporary insight into procurement and tendering in the 
construction industry, with emphasis on SME contractors, existing relationships, and open-book 
negotiation. This research illustrates the adverse effects of early cost estimates produced without 
first securing a true understanding of project buildability and programming. Our work concludes 
with a novel insight into an alternative procurement option that involves early SME contractor in-
volvement in an open-book environment, without the need for a third-party cost control. 




Following the Joint Contracts Tribunal (JCT')’s launch of the Design and Build (D&B) 
form of contract in 1981 [1], the UK construction industry has moved away from traditional 
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procurement routes involving bills of quantities and designs complete to RIBA Stage 4—
Technical Design [2,3]. Instead, construction professionals and clients have opted for sin-
gle-stage or two-stage competitive D&B tendering, with an often- incomplete design to 
RIBA stages 2 or 3 viz: Concept Design or Developed Design, respectively [4]. This ap-
proach embeds ambiguity within the scope of works included in the tender documents, 
due to a lack of design information [5]. Consequently, the project requirements are largely 
defined and delineated by the contractors’ interpretations [6], thus increasing the diffi-
culty of levelling bids, especially due to the inclusion of qualifications that form the basis 
of the tender return [7,8]. In addition, this approach reduces the clarity of procuring a 
contractor who has fully understood and allowed for the full extent of the scope of the 
works [9]. This lack of clarity in terms of scope, and the inherently competitive element of 
this procurement route, compel contractors to strategically plan their approach to each 
tender in order to increase the appeal of their tender return [10] and participate in the 
infamous ”race to the bottom” [11]. By producing an artificially low tender sum, contractors 
seek to improve their chances of being called for a post-tender interview [12]. However, 
this strategy encourages decisions to exclude work items and then use provisional or 
prime cost sums to reduce element costs, and/or value engineering of the specification in 
order to offer cheaper alternatives [13]. 
Lack of consistency across the bids is a major issue with this approach, because it 
becomes increasingly difficult for the professional quantity surveyor (PQS) to align bids 
and conduct a thorough tender adjudication [14,15]. In contrast, a traditional bill of quanti-
ties allows for much easier comparison, because it is a uniform document providing item-
ised, measured quantities [16]. Consequently, the process of comparing tenders often in-
volves looking purely at the bottom-line figure and ignoring the contents allowed within 
them [17], thus contradicting the guidance set out in the JCT Tendering Practise Note 2017 
[18]. Therefore, during tender negotiations, and following the commencement of works 
on site, the costs tend to increase significantly to reflect the true scope of the works [19]. 
For example, the Scottish Parliament building was originally budgeted for a contract sum 
of GBP GBP 40 million (UK Sterling) in 1999, but the final account settled in 2004 was a 
staggering GBP GBP 414 million [20]. Another notable example was the London Crossrail 
Programme, which saw an increase in the total sum of the various contracts from GBP 
GBP 14.8 billion in 2013 to GBP GBP 17.6 billion in 2018 [21]. Similarly, the Olympic 
Games’ original construction budget was GBP GBP 4.2 billion in 2005 when the site prep-
aration for the Olympic Park commenced, but the final construction costs were reported 
to be an astonishing GBP GBP 9.32 billion in 2011 [22,23]. 
Given this backdrop, this research reports upon a successfully negotiated project, as 
a contemporary vignette of a case study in practice that illustrates the palpable benefits 
that this approach has over the often unsuccessful competitively tendered procurement 
route. Specifically, this work uncovers the strategic decisions made by the contractor to 
improve the chances of securing the project, and answers the question: does a negotiated 
contract provide a better option (for the mutual benefit of all parties) than the competi-
tively tendered contract? Such work adds much-needed modernity to the wider field of 
studies on the cost escalations involved in different types of procurement paths, but also 
offers invaluable insight into the actual cost variances experienced by a small-to-medium 
enterprise (SME)-sized contractor using a negotiated contract; case study research using 
SME contractors and real-life cost data is relatively scant in academic literature. Upon 
achieving these aims, associated objectives seek to generate renewed polemic discourse 
on the importance of defining and understanding the scope of works, reduce variations 
and improve cost certainty for all involved parties, and engender greater transparency in 
order to avoid disputes as projects progress—resulting in greater client satisfaction, in-
creased contractor profitability, and enhanced value management. 
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2. Procurement and Tendering in the UK Construction Industry: A Review 
The Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors (RICS) [24] defines procurement as “the 
overall act of obtaining goods and services from external sources i.e., a building contrac-
tor”, and tendering as “the bidding process to obtain a price and how a contractor is ap-
pointed.” Over time, the process has adapted; originally being a mechanism to control 
various trades required to carry out construction works [25], it has developed into a sys-
tem to capture and manage the client’s needs (ibid). In the construction industry, procure-
ment and tendering usually involves some form of competition [26]. In order to appoint 
the most appropriate contractor to carry out the works, various procurement routes have 
been developed [27]. Figure 1 presents a timeline showing the evolution of procurement 
in the construction industry. 
 
Figure 1. Timeline showing the evolution of procurement in the construction industry [25,28–35]. 
3. Preferred Tendering and Procurement Routes 
The shift from traditionally procured projects towards D&B procurement routes is 
apparent from the National Construction Contracts and Law Surveys [35–37]. This trend 
can also be observed internationally [38]. In surveys carried out in 2012, 22% of consult-
ants had been involved in D&B-procured projects [36], which increased to 37% [35] and 
41% [37] in the 2015 and 2018 surveys, respectively. Contrastingly, consultants’ involve-
ment in traditionally procured projects was 72% in 2012 [36], and fell to 52% in 2015 [35] 
and 48% in 2018 [37]. These data highlight a clear shift in the preferred procurement routes 
in the UK construction industry; Naoum and Egbu [39] supported this view through their 
literature synthesis [40–42], concluding that there has been a particularly evident increase 
in D&B projects. The 2018 NBS survey showed 82% of participants as being involved in 
single-stage competitive tenders, 50% being involved in two-stage competitive tenders, 
and 50% in negotiations (ibid), highlighting an industry-wide preference for competitively 
tendered procurement routes [43]. 
4. Strategic Pricing Pre-Contract and Change Orders Post-Contract 
During competitively tendered projects, Okada et al. [44] acknowledge that there has 
been an increase in contractors taking strategic pricing decisions and submitting artifi-
cially low/underpriced bids in order to win a project. This tactic is a common feature in 
the D&B procurement route and, consequently, changes to the contract sum are inevitable 
Buildings 2021, 11, 260 4 of 30 
 
to reflect the true scope of the works [45]. Therefore, contractors rely on change orders and 
scope alterations as an opportunity to recuperate lost profits through cost increases for 
completing additional works [44]. Change can be perceived as any alteration to the scope, 
period, cost, and or/quality of the contracted works [46]. Although undesirable to the cli-
ent, change is inevitable during construction works [45,47,48]. Hence, ”change” and the 
subsequent cost increases [49] increase the contract sum to reflect the true value of the 
employer’s requirements, as opposed to the scope allowed at tender stage [45]. The RIBA 
plan of works [50] outlines the whole life cycle of the construction process. The introduction 
of Stage 0—Strategic Definition was to further enhance the core design phases by confirm-
ing the client requirements (refer to Figure 2). The RIBA Plan of Work suggests that all 
design changes should occur from stages 1–4, with the exception of site queries at stage 5 
[3]. However, current literature recognises that change often occurs during the construc-
tion phase and, therefore, there is a need to understand what the cause and effects of 
changes are, so that mitigation strategies can be adopted [51]. Table 1 summarises the 
sources of change during the construction phase, and the resultant effects are time, cost, 
or quality alterations to the project parameters [46]. 
 
Figure 2. RIBA Plan of Work 2020 design involvement/responsibility [3,50,52–57]. 
Table 1. Sources of change during the construction phase. 
Source of Change Description of the Source Reference 
Design errors Oversights, mistakes, and inaccuracies in the design information that forms part of the 
contract documents. Resulting in revisions of the drawings therefore allowing the con-
tractor to claim for the cost of the additional works. 
[44,58–62]. 
Design omissions Design information lacking sufficient information to allow the full extent of the project to 
be costed. Therefore, adding in the omissions at a later date is supplemented by cost in-
creases. 
[44,58–62]. 
Client-driven Changes requested / variation enquiries by the client that affect the time cost or quality of 
the project. Any change request provides the contractor an opportunity to revalue the 
item of works and submit a revised cost. 
[44,58–62]. 
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Changes to the 
scope of works 
Changes to the contract documents i.e. contractor qualifications, clarifications or omis-
sions resulting in additional work on top of the contractual works. This can include re-in-
troducing items that had been excluded by the contractor or changes to design to allow 
the work to be physically carried out due to an oversight of the complexity and buildabil-




Discrepancies in the contract documents i.e. fundamental differences between the archi-
tects and structural engineers drawing. This links to changes the scope of works as it is de-
pendent on the contractor’s clarifications as to what the costing was based on. 
[58]. 
Managerial factors Changes resulting from failings of the client’s team. Including but not limited to: 
- Inaccurate cost estimates and advise to the client due to a lack of understand-
ing of buildability 
- Design information not produced on time creating ambiguity 
- Inability to learn from passed experience and relying solely bottom-line com-
parison 




The ‘unknown-unknowns’ - Things that cannot be foreseen or accounted for i.e. force 
majeure or regulatory changes. 
[44,59,61] 
Smith et al. [49] concluded that the sources of change can be categorised under the 
overarching issue of a poorly defined brief and design during the project’s early stages. This 
directly impacts contractors’ tender submissions, therefore making change and cost in-
creases during the delivery phase inevitable so as to correct the flawed project brief (ibid). 
Furthermore, the client consultant team are often out of their depth, with designers pro-
ducing concepts that are not achievable in practice due to a lack of technical construction 
knowledge, and PQSs providing cost estimates without understanding or considering the 
sequencing and buildability of works (ibid). Consequently, early cost estimates produced 
for clients are often inaccurate and, thus, budgetary advice for the project is lower than 
the true cost of carrying out the works [65]. The concept of ”rework” is applicable to this 
situation [62], which includes failure of the design team and cost consultants to produce 
a tender pack free from errors, omissions, and inconsistencies early in the project [66], 
during RIBA stages 2 and 3 [50]. Hence, had the client’s consultants been more competent 
and produced an accurate brief [67], contractors would not have had to make strategic 
pricing decisions in order to submit the lowest price [68]. There is much discussion 
amongst academics regarding the effects of ”rework”. Love [66], as cited by Forcada et al. 
[58], states that rework contributes to 52% of total cost increases, and can range from 5% 
to 20% of the contract value. Analysis of 359 projects by Hwang et al. [69] concluded that 
rework costs added an extra 5% to the contract value and, similarly, Taylor et al. [61] found 
the average increase of change orders to be 4.53% among 610 contracts studied. Various 
other research studies have revealed that rework costs can account for up to 20% [62] of 
the contract value, with Fayek et al. [70] reporting 2–12%, and Oyewobi et al. [71] reporting 
5.06% and 3.23% for new builds and refurbishments, respectively. 
The main contractor is usually held accountable for the resultant increases in the final 
account caused by the changes, leading to worsened contractor–client relationships [72]. 
However, this is an inaccurate prognosis of a complex issue [63]. The reality supports the 
findings of Smith et al. [49] that the clients’ team of consultants is at fault, while the con-
tractor is merely the scapegoat for their failings. Therefore, Clause 2.12 of the JCT Design 
and Build Contract [73] applies, and any inadequacies found with the design are recti-
fied—”the employers’ requirements shall be corrected, altered or modified accordingly’ and 
Buildings 2021, 11, 260 6 of 30 
 
‘treated as a change’”. Under clause 5.2 regarding evaluation of changes, the contractor is en-
titled to the additional value of the work, and the contract sum increases to reflect this 
(ibid). 
5. The Need for Change 
Competitiveness is a recognised characteristic of the construction industry [74] and 
thus, procurement often takes place via competitive tendering routes, such as the D&B or 
design, bid, build approaches [75]. These routes often increase project duration, cost over-
runs, change orders, and rework, ultimately leaving the client dissatisfied [76]. Briscoe 
and Dainty [77] suggested that this was due to the vast number of stakeholders involved 
in construction projects, resulting in fragmentation and a lack of integration—a view sup-
ported by Harper et al. [78] and Papadonikolaki and Wamelink [79]. Project team mem-
bers work almost exclusively on their portion of the works [80], further highlighting the 
fragmented environment created by these procurement routes [81]. To address the issues 
of competitive procurement routes, a cultural change is required in order to promote and 
incorporate collaboration [74,76]. 
The concept of integrated project delivery (IPD) was established in order to address 
these issues [82], by improving project efficiency through collaboration [81], therefore re-
ducing the number of changes during the construction phase in order to avoid increased 
costs, whilst also seeking to offer cost savings and shorter durations [83]. Following its 
inception, surveys carried out suggested that competitive tendering was not an effective 
procurement method (ibid). Further studies showed that six projects that adapted IPD 
were able to successfully deliver or exceed the clients’ requirements in terms of budget, 
programme, and design [84]. The research findings suggested that the reasons for success 
were due to traditional issues being avoided through enhanced collaboration and early 
involvement, therefore reducing ambiguity within the scope of the works. Early contractor 
involvement allowed for more realistic bids as the competitive element was removed 
(ibid). Collins and Parrish [45] support this position, arguing that early involvement of all 
project stakeholders (including the contractor) is more advantageous for offering cost cer-
tainty to the client. Figure 3 identifies an IPD team selection process using a case study 
project detailing how early stakeholder involvement and collaboration was achieved [85]. 
Despite the recognised benefits of IPD, it is not widely used in the UK construction indus-
try [86]. This lack of adoption may contribute to projects that continue to be completed 
over budget and with extended durations. Arguably, IPD has not gained momentum due 
to its close relationship with building information modelling (BIM), and the associated 
barriers to entry this presents (ibid). Other barriers are defined in Figure 4. 
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Figure 3. Integrated project delivery (IPD) selection process [26,34,85,87–91]. 
 
Figure 4. Barriers to integrated project delivery (IPD) [76,81,85,91–95]. 
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Due to these barriers, an alternative tender and procurement route is required in or-
der to avoid the “lowest price wins” scenario [85], which does not achieve best value or 
successful project delivery for the client [92]. There appears to be a notable gap in current 
literature exploring negotiation as a procurement route to achieve the desired cost cer-
tainty by avoiding contractors’ strategic low-pricing tactics; hence, the rationale for this re-
search. 
6. Research Methodology 
This research adopts a mixed philosophical stance that combines interpretivism [96–
98] and pragmatism [99]. As an epistemological stance, interpretivism was adopted in or-
der to critically review extant literature and generate questions that then informed the en-
suing inductive research approach, which sought to generate new theory on “negotiation” 
as a viable procurement path [100]. Interpretivism has been extensively used within con-
struction management and civil engineering research [101–103]. For example, Roberts et 
al. [104] reviewed the benefits and challenges of digital asset management, while Al-Saeed 
et al. [105] sought to automate construction manufacturing procedures using building in-
formation modelling (BIM) digital objects. Pragmatism [106] was adopted in order to 
analyse practitioner perceptions and values, so as to resolve the phenomena under in-
vestigation. This overarching epistemological design was contextualised within a case 
study strategy [107]—specifically, a successfully secured and delivered negotiated project 
wherein the main contractor was not responsible for the design. The project consisted of a 
new-build swimming pool and gym at a private dwelling with a floor area of 125 m2. The 
main contractor (which was an SME) was based in Birmingham, UK, and operates mainly 
in the West Midlands conurbation, undertaking work in various sectors, including indus-
trial, residential, commercial, and private dwellings. The contractor employs only 10 peo-
ple, and has an annual turnover of circa GBP GBP 5 million—this research therefore gives 
a rare glimpse of project costings as experienced by an SME contractor. The research 
method follows a waterfall process, using three key phases consisting of: (1) literature re-
view and pilot study; (2) quantitative analysis of the case study data; and (3) qualitative 
data collection using a focus group (Figure 5). 
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Figure 5. Waterfall research methodology. 
Phase 1—Literature review and pilot study: Published literature on tendering and 
procurement was reviewed, and a pilot study convened with three professional practi-
tioners (who also participated in the focus group), in order to assess the failure of compet-
itive tendering and the need to develop a more successful procurement route for SMEs. 
During these discussions, findings from the literature were presented to pilot study par-
ticipants in order to: (1) elicit professional practitioner feedback and guidance on the rel-
evance and currency of the body of knowledge accumulated for the present study; (2) 
secure their insight on the key questions that should be posed and the types of data that 
should be collected in order to allow a robust analysis to commence; and (3) check on the 
validity of both the approach adopted and the scientific instruments used (such as for data 
collection). At the end of the pilot work, minor modifications were made to the questions 
developed for the focus group, in order to remove any ambiguity. 
Phase 2—Quantitative analysis of the case study data: The main contract works as 
described in the JCT Minor Works 2016 contract were to carry out the construction of a 
single-storey gymnasium and swimming pool. Works on site commenced on 7 May 2019, 
and practical completion was achieved in December 2019. The contract sum was GBP GBP 
294,994, and the final account agreed at GBP GBP 325,118. Participant action research 
(PAR) was implemented by the lead researcher, who worked as part of the project team for 
the main contractor [108]. Throughout the project’s duration, monthly valuations were 
compiled in order to track the costs incurred on site, including preliminaries, drawdown, 
main contract works, and variations. This process also provided the facility to track the 
anticipated final account against the contract sum. The valuations became the application 
for payment, with the final valuation forming the basis of the final account. Quantitative 
cost data were extracted from the valuation reports, and empirical research implemented 
in order to determine cost differences (e.g., anticipated versus actual values) for various 
elements of the construction works. Qualitative narratives described the variations in the 
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valuations, and provided justification for cost changes. Bivariate regression was then used 
to highlight the relationship between the monthly cumulative cost growth and the project 
duration, and then benchmarked against the agreed contract sum. 
Phase 3—Qualitative data collection using a focus group: Upon completion of the 
data analysis phase, the results were presented to a focus group (held on MS Teams) con-
sisting of three professional practitioner participants who were involved in the project 
management team (refer to Table 2). Participants were required to have a minimum of 
five years of industry experience, so as to ensure that they held the required competence 
to discuss the phenomena under investigation. A semi-structured data collection instru-
ment that contained open-ended questions sourced from Phases 1 and 2 was developed 
and used to gather data. Participants were invited to provide their opinions of: (1) tender-
ing and procurement, and the reasons for changes; and (2) the procurement route used, 
and whether they deemed this to have been a factor influencing the success of the project. 
This abductive approach [109] allowed evidence to be drawn together in order to derive 
reasoned conclusions. 
Table 2. Demographic profiles of focus group participants. 
Participant Position in Business 
Years of Experience in 
Industry 
Years of Experience in 
Current Position 
Highest Qualification 
A Managing Director 35+ 
13 as MD and 7 prior to 
that as a regional director 
MCIOB 
B Commercial Manager 23 3 BSc 
C Site Manager 32 20 CIOB (Level 4) and SMSTS 
7. Analysis 
Data analysis involved collecting all of the applications for payment (16 in total—
including 2 within the final account) in the case study project and presenting the cost data 
in a spreadsheet in order to show the bimonthly cumulative growth for the construction 
works, preliminaries, overheads and profit, materials on site, and variations. In collecting 
the data, an arithmetic error was found from Application 1 to Application 7—a SUM for-
mula included in the Excel application for payment document did not capture all of the 
costs intended. The main contractor identified this error and corrected it in Application 8. 
For this research, the arithmetic error has been corrected, and the data have been adjusted 
to reflect the true cumulative costs had the error not occurred. 
Once the applications data were compiled into one spreadsheet, they were then 
sorted into subcategories (e.g., Prelims: Fixed; Prelims: Time-Related, etc.) and the various 
construction works elements, following the BCIS elements [110] showing the cumulative 
cost growth. Variations were allocated to the corresponding preliminary item or construc-
tion works element. This process highlighted five variations that formed new items of 
work that did not form part of the main contract. To avoid the anticipated versus actual 
cost data being skewed, two cost summaries of the applications for payment were pro-
duced: the first showing all cost data, including the variations classified as “Additional 
Works”; and the second excluding the “Additional Works” items, in order to allow cost 
versus value analysis (Tables 3 and 4). 
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Table 3. Cost data to show bimonthly cumulative growth. 
 APPLIC ATION FINAL ACCOUNT 




 SUM                 
 
ESTIMATED TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
COST                 
Prelims: Fixed £12,215.00 £648.00 £810.00 £810.00 £810.00 £1092.00 £1092.00 £5730.75 £7277.00 £7277.00 £7277.00 £7737.00 £9060.00 £9060.00 £11,706.00 £12,215.00 £12,215.00 
Prelims: Time Re-
lated 
£29,628.37 £2370.27 £4740.54 £7407.09 £9777.36 £12,443.92 £14,814.19 £17,283.22 £19,752.25 £22,221.28 £24,690.31 £27,159.34 £29,628.37 £29,628.37 £33,906.37 £33,906.37 £29,628.37 
Prelims: adjust-
ment to final 
                 
account                −£509.00 −£509.00 
0. Facilitating 
works 
£3742.00 £3167.00 £3217.00 £3217.00 £3217.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3742.00 £3742.00 £3742.00 £3742.00 £3742.00 
1. Substructure £30,729.93 £6878.00 £15,900.41 £25,559.56 £28,579.56 £28,253.03 £28,253.03 £28,253.03 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,946.92 £25,805.00 £25,245.00 
2.1 Structural 
Frame 
£1500.00 £0.00 £900.00 £1350.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 
2.3 Roof Structure £30,388.57 £1426.50 £1426.50 £2853.00 £5940.47 £10,720.47 £15,220.47 £21,369.11 £29,197.46 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,670.57 £30,670.57 
2.5 External Walls £15,756.71 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £6684.60 £13,845.86 £14,209.61 £15,271.71 £15,271.71 £15,271.71 £15,271.71 £15,654.96 £15,654.96 £15,654.96 £15,654.96 £15,894.71 £15,894.71 
2.6 Windows & Ex-
ternal Doors 
£27,994.00 £0.00 £0.00 £559.88 £0.00 −£199.80 £2039.72 £2039.72 £14,467.36 £17,534.83 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,142.00 £29,142.00 
2.7 Internal Walls 
& Partitions 
£22,386.10 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £232.16 £232.16 £348.24 £348.24 £1246.80 £11,772.41 £19,611.67 £22,085.77 £22,031.29 £22,031.29 £22,031.29 £22,166.10 £22,166.10 
2.8 Internal Doors 
(Joinery) 
£2159.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £50.00 £901.97 £1736.97 £1756.97 £1756.97 £1756.97 £2560.00 £2560.00 
3.1 Wall Finishes £5850.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £670.00 £670.00 £1715.00 £4150.34 £4485.34 £4485.34 £4485.34 £4610.00 £4610.00 
3.2 Floor Finishes £1310.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £220.00 £0.00 £1060.00 £1060.00 £1280.00 £1280.00 £1280.00 £1280.00 
3.3 Ceiling Finishes £11,237.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £1978.00 £3956.00 £6923.00 £10,167.50 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 
4. FF&E £400.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £200.00 £400.00 £524.30 £524.30 £650.00 £650.00 
5.1 M&E £54,859.00 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £16,367.70 £27,279.50 £38,191.30 £54,481.00 £57,208.95 £57,698.69 £57,698.69 £58,492.00 £58,492.00 
5.11 Lightning Pro-
tection 
£500.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
5.14 BWIC £1000.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £250.00 £250.00 £250.00 £200.00 £500.00 £750.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 
8.2 Roads, Paths, 
Paving’s & 
                 
Surfacing’s £8760.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £70.00 £2577.50 £8670.00 £9130.00 £9130.00 
8.3 Soft Landscap-
ing 
£500.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £1336.20 £1480.50 £2301.00 £2301.00 
8.4 Fencing, Rail-
ings & Walls 
£80.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £1406.19 £1406.19 £1486.19 £1486.19 £1486.19 £1744.00 £1744.00 
8.6 External Drain-
age 
£9593.00 £0.00 £6143.75 £6143.75 £6143.75 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £8420.70 £10,040.70 £10,043.00 £10,043.00 
8.7 External Ser-
vices 
£3825.00 £0.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2950.00 £3825.00 £3825.00 £3825.00 £3825.00 
Additional Work 1: 
Extent 
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Building by 450 
mm 
£0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £656.06 £1180.90 £1180.90 £2361.80 £2361.80 £2361.80 £2361.80 £2624.23 £2624.23 £2624.23 £2639.00 £2639.00 
Additional Work 2: 
Patio, shed 
                 
base and supplies 
to outdoor 
                 
kitchen £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £3362.14 £12,103.72 £13,179.60 £13,655.00 £13,655.00 
Additional Works 
3: Outdoor 
                 
kitchen £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £4810.00 £6794.82 £6972.00 £6972.00 
Additional Works 
4: Outdoor 
                 
kitchen foundation £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £820.48 £825.00 £825.00 
Additional Works 
5: Gravel to 
                 
driveway £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £2230.00 £2230.00 
Construction 
works adjustment 
                 
to final account                £122.81 £122.81 
OH&P £20,581.03 £1107.19 £2668.95 £3776.11 £4899.95 £6161.60 £6922.33 £8144.57 £11,295.81 £13,699.01 £16,666.40 £18,727.58 £19,624.44 £21,296.15 £22,458.90 £23,045.52 £22,682.67 
Material on site; 
Aqua panel & anti 
corrosive stud 
£0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £15,000.00 £15,000.00 £7500.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
Material on site; 
paving slabs 
£0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £3043.40 £3043.40 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 










Table 4. Cost data to show bimonthly cumulative growth (excluding additional work). 
 APPLICATION 
DESCRIPTION 





TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL TOTAL 
Prelims: Fixed £12,215.00 £648.00 £810.00 £810.00 £810.00 £1092.00 £1092.00 £5730.75 £7277.00 £7277.00 £7277.00 £7737.00 £9060.00 £9060.00 £11,706.00 
Prelims: Time Related £29,628.37 £2370.27 £4740.54 £7407.09 £9777.36 £12,443.92 £14,814.19 £17,283.22 £19,752.25 £22,221.28 £24,690.31 £27,159.34 £29,628.37 £29,628.37 £33,906.37 
Prelims: adjustment to final                
account                
0. Facilitating works £3742.00 £3167.00 £3217.00 £3217.00 £3217.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3517.00 £3742.00 £3742.00 £3742.00 
1. Substructure £30,729.93 £6878.00 £15,900.41 £25,559.56 £28,579.56 £28,253.03 £28,253.03 £28,253.03 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,290.17 £25,946.92 
2.1 Structural Frame £1500.00 £0.00 £900.00 £1350.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 £1500.00 
2.3 Roof Structure £30,388.57 £1426.50 £1426.50 £2853.00 £5940.47 £10,720.47 £15,220.47 £21,369.11 £29,197.46 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 £30,669.76 
2.5 External Walls £15,756.71 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £6684.60 £13,845.86 £14,209.61 £15,271.71 £15,271.71 £15,271.71 £15,271.71 £15,654.96 £15,654.96 £15,654.96 £15,654.96 
2.6 Windows & External Doors £27,994.00 £0.00 £0.00 £559.88 £0.00 −£199.80 £2039.72 £2039.72 £14,467.36 £17,534.83 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 £29,134.53 
2.7 Internal Walls & Partitions £22,386.10 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £232.16 £232.16 £348.24 £348.24 £1246.80 £11,772.41 £19,611.67 £22,085.77 £22,031.29 £22,031.29 £22,031.29 
2.8 Internal Doors (Joinery) £2159.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £50.00 £901.97 £1736.97 £1756.97 £1756.97 £1756.97 
3.1 Wall Finishes £5850.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £670.00 £670.00 £1715.00 £4150.34 £4485.34 £4485.34 £4485.34 
3.2 Floor Finishes £1310.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £220.00 £0.00 £1060.00 £1060.00 £1280.00 £1280.00 
3.3 Ceiling Finishes £11,237.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £1978.00 £3956.00 £6923.00 £10,167.50 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 £10,662.00 
4. FF&E £400.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £200.00 £400.00 £524.30 £524.30 
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5.1 M&E £54,859.00 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £272.80 £16,367.70 £27,279.50 £38,191.30 £54,481.00 £57,208.95 £57,698.69 £57,698.69 
5.11 Lightning Protection £500.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
5.14 BWIC £1000.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £250.00 £250.00 £250.00 £200.00 £500.00 £750.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 £1000.00 
8.2 Roads, Paths, Paving’s &                
Surfacing’s £8760.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £70.00 £2577.50 £8670.00 
8.3 Soft Landscaping £500.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £1336.20 £1480.50 
8.4 Fencing, Railings & Walls £80.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £1406.19 £1406.19 £1486.19 £1486.19 £1486.19 
8.6 External Drainage £9593.00 £0.00 £6143.75 £6143.75 £6143.75 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £7396.20 £8420.70 £10,040.70 
8.7 External Services £3825.00 £0.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2175.00 £2950.00 £3825.00 £3825.00 
Additional Work 1: Extent                
Building by 450 mm £0.00               
Additional Work 2: Patio, shed                
base and supplies to outdoor                
kitchen £0.00               
Additional Works 3: Outdoor                
kitchen £0.00               
Additional Works 4: Outdoor                
kitchen foundation £0.00               
Additional Works 5: Gravel to                
driveway £0.00               
Construction works adjustment                
to final account                
OH&P £20,581.03 £1107.19 £2668.95 £3776.11 £4899.95 £6161.60 £6922.33 £8144.57 £11,295.81 £13,699.01 £16,666.40 £18,727.58 £19,624.44 £21,296.15 £22,458.90 
Material on site; Aqua panel & anti 
corrosive stud 
£0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £15,000.00 £15,000.00 £7500.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 
Material on site; paving slabs £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £0.00 £3043.40 £3043.40 £0.00 £0.00 
 £294,994.71 £15,869.76 £38,254.94 £54,124.18 £70,232.64 £87,660.23 £98,010.58 £130,529.34 £174,580.46 £201,466.86 £236,331.71 £268,787.21 £277,854.57 £283,060.12 £299,660.42 
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7.1. Cross-Sectional Time Horizon (Based on Table 3) 
The cross-sectional time horizon was completed in order to show the percentage in-
crease or decrease of the various construction works elements, together with the reasons 
for these changes, as classified by the professional practitioners involved in the project 
(Table 5). 
Table 5. Cross-sectional time horizon. 
Description 
Contract Sum Final Account Agreed 





Prelims: Fixed £12,215 £12,215 £− £12,215 0.00% No change 
Prelims: Time Re-
lated 
£29,628 £29,628 £− £29,628 0.00% 
No change (V036. removed from fi-
nal account 
      as agreed) 
Prelims: adjust-
ment to 
£− −£509 £− −£509 New entry Arithmetical error 
final account       
0. Facilitating 
works 
£3742 £3742 £− £3742 0.00% No change 
1. Substructure £30,730 £29,100 −£3855 £25,245 −17.85% V02.Client-driven 
      V06.Unforeseen conditions 
      




£1500 £1500 £− £1500 0.00% No change 
2.3 Roof Structure £30,389 £30,389 £282 £30,671 0.93% V08.Other-Material availability 
      V012.Client Driven 
      V016.Design error/omission 
2.5 External Walls £15,757 £15,757 £138 £15,895 0.88% V07.Client-driven 
      V09.Design error 
2.6 Windows & Ex-
ternal 
£27,994 £27,994 £1148 £29,142 4.10% V05.Design error/omission 
Doors       
2.7 Internal Walls 
& 
£22,386 £22,146 £20 £22,166 −0.98% V010.Design error/omission 
Partitions      V014.Design error 
      V020.Change to scope of works 
2.8 Internal Doors £2159 £2159 £401 £2560 18.57% V018.Client-driven 
(Joinery)      V019.Change to scope of works 
      V022.Client-driven 
3.1 Wall Finishes £5850 £5850 −£1240 £4610 −21.20% V021. Client-driven 
      
V025.Client-driven/change to scope 
of works 
3.2 Floor Finishes £1310 £1060 £220 £1280 −2.29% V013.Change to scope of work 
3.3 Ceiling Finishes £11,237 £10,662 £− £10,662 −5.12% 
False ceiling to steam shower Not 
required 
      therefore, value not drawn 
4. FF&E £400 £400 £250 £650 62.50% V027.Client-driven 
5.1 M&E £54,859 £54,859 £3633 £58,492 6.62% V011.Client-driven 
      V026.Client-driven 
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      V028.Client-driven 
      V029.Design error/omission 
      V030.Client-driven 
      V035.2. Client-driven 
      V037.Design error 
5.11 Lightning £500 £− £− £− −100.00% 
Not required therefore value not 
drawn 
Protection       
5.14 BWIC £1000 £1000 £− £1000 0.00% No change 
8.2 Roads, Paths, £8760 £8010 £1120 £9130 4.22% 




     required therefore value not drawn 
      V031.Client-driven 
      V032.Unforseen conditions 
      V035.3. Client-driven 
8.3 Soft Landscap-
ing 





£80 £80 £1664 £1744 2080.00% V015.Client-driven 
Walls      V035.1. Client-driven 
8.6 External Drain-
age 
£9593 £9593 £450 £10,043 4.69% V03.Design error 
      V04.Design omission 
8.7 External Ser-
vices 
£3825 £3825 £− £3825 0.00% No change 
Additional Work 1: £− £− £2639 £2639 New entry V01.Client-driven 
Extent Building by       
450 mm       
Additional Work 2: £− £− £13,655 £13,655 New entry V017.Client-driven 
Patio, shed base 
and 
     V033.Change to scope of work 
supplies to outdoor       
kitchen       
Additional Works 
3: 
£− £− £6972 £6972 New entry V024.A. Client-driven 
Outdoor kitchen       
Additional Works 
4: 
£− £− £825 £825 New entry V024.B. Client-driven 
Outdoor kitchen       
foundation       
Additional Works 
5: 
£− £− £2230 £2230 New entry V038.Client-driven 
Gravel to driveway       
Construction 
Works: 
£− £123 £− £123 New entry Arithmetical error 
adjustment to final       
account       
OH&P £20,581 £20,256 £2426 £22,683 10.21%  
TOTAL: £294,995 £290,339 £34,779 £325,118 10.21% As discussed above 
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Of the 30 categories, 6 saw no change from the contract sum to the final account, 11 
saw a percentage increase, s6 saw a percentage decrease, and there were 7 new entries in 
the final account that did not form part of the contract sum. Of the 7 new entries, 5 ac-
counted for the additional work outside of the contract sum and 2 were due to arithmetic 
errors. The 5 items of additional works identified added GBP 26,321, which equates to 
8.92% of the contract sum. Due to these items not being foreseen at the outset, there was 
no value allocated against them. The overall percentage error was 10.21%. The three pro-
fessional practitioners (i.e., Commercial Manager, Site Manager, and Managing Director) 
involved in the project classified each variation with a weighting out of 100%. The occur-
rence for each response (without considering the weighting) was as follows: design error 
(19); design omission (13); client-driven (55); change to scope of works (31); managerial 
factors (3); unforeseen conditions (11); and other (2). Upon final allocation of the classi-
fications, 5.5 were due to design errors, 2.5 to design omission, 20 were client-driven, 5 
due to changes to the scope of works, 0 to managerial factors, 3 to unforeseen conditions, 
and 3 for other reasons. Conclusively, the main reasons for changes were client driven (at 
51.28%). 
7.2. Cross-Sectional Time Horizon (Based on Table 4) 
The cross-sectional time horizon was repeated as described above in order to show 
the percentage increase or decrease supported by justification for variations, excluding the 
five additional works items (Table 6). Removing the additional works items resulted in 25 
categories; as before, 6 categories had no change, 11 had a percentage increase, 6 had a 
percentage decrease, and there were now 2 new entries due to arithmetic errors in the 
final account. The overall percentage error was 1.29%. This low overall percentage in-
crease suggests that cost certainty was achieved, as there was little variance from the con-
tract sum to the agreed final account. A two-tailed paired sample t-test was completed on 
Excel. The null hypothesis under investigation was that the mean difference between the 
anticipated and actual costs would equal zero, and the alternative hypothesis was that the 
mean difference between the anticipated and actual costs would not equal zero. The t-test 
results were:  t-statistic = 0.49 (2 dp); and critical t-statistic for two-tailed test = 2.06 (2 dp). 
Due to the fact that the t-statistic < the critical t-statistic, we can accept the null hypothesis. 
Therefore, the data suggest that the mean difference can equal zero, thus suggesting that 
cost certainty was achieved. The data were also used to calculate the mean difference, 
standard deviation of the difference, standard error of the difference, and the confidence 
intervals (Table 7). 




Final Account Agreed 






Prelims: Fixed £12,215 £12,215 £− £12,215 0.00% No change 
Prelims: Time Re-
lated 
£29,628 £29,628 £− £29,628 0.00% 
No change (V036. removed from fi-
nal account as agreed) 
Prelims: adjustment 
to final 
£− −£509 £− −£509 New entry Arithmetical error 
account       
0. Facilitating 
works 
£3742 £3742 £− £3742 0.00% No change 
1. Substructure £30,730 £29,100 −£3855 £25,245 −17.85% V02.Client-driven 
      V06.Unforeseen conditions 
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£1500 £1500 £− £1500 0.00% No change 
2.3 Roof Structure £30,389 £30,389 £282 £30,671 0.93% V08.Other-Material availability 
      V012.Client Driven 
      V016.Design error/omission 
2.5 External Walls £15,757 £15,757 £138 £15,895 0.88% V07.Client-driven 
      V09.Design error 
2.6 Windows & Ex-
ternal 
£27,994 £27,994 £1148 £29,142 4.10% V05.Design error/omission 
Doors       
2.7 Internal Walls & £22,386 £22,146 £20 £22,166 −0.98% V010.Design error/omission 
Partitions      V014.Design error 
      V020.Change to scope of works 
2.8 Internal Doors 
(Joinery) 
£2159 £2159 £401 £2560 18.57% V018.Client-driven 
      V019.Change to scope of works 
      V022.Client-driven 
3.1 Wall Finishes £5850 £5850 −£1240 £4610 −21.20% V021. Client-driven 
      
V025.Client-driven/change to scope 
of works 
3.2 Floor Finishes £1310 £1060 £220 £1280 −2.29% V013.Change to scope of work 
3.3 Ceiling Finishes £11,237 £10,662 £− £10,662 −5.12% 
False ceiling to steam shower Not 
required therefore value 
      not drawn 
4. FF&E £400 £400 £250 £650 62.50% V027.Client-driven 
5.1 M&E £54,859 £54,859 £3633 £58,492 6.62% V011.Client-driven 
      V026.Client-driven 
      V028.Client-driven 
      V029.Design error/omission 
      V030.Client-driven 
      V035.2. Client-driven 
      V037.Design error 
5.11 Lightning Pro-
tection 
£500 £− £− £− −100.00% 
Not required therefore value not 
drawn 
5.14 BWIC £1000 £1000 £ - £1000 0.00% No change 
8.2 Roads, Paths, 
Paving’s 
£8760 £8010 £1120 £9130 4.22% 
Construction of new brick bier and 
capping’s not required 
& Surfacing’s      therefore value not drawn 
      V031.Client-driven 
      V032.Unforseen conditions 
      V035.3. Client-driven 
8.3 Soft Landscap-
ing 
£500 £500 £1801 £2301 360.20% V023.Change to scope of works 
8.4 Fencing, Rail-
ings & 
£80 £80 £1664 £1744 2080.00% V015.Client-driven 
Walls      V035.1. Client-driven 
8.6 External Drain-
age 
£9593 £9593 £450 £10,043 4.69% V03.Design error 
      V04.Design omission 




£3825 £3825 £− £3825 0.00% No change 
Construction works £− £123 £− £123 New entry Arithmetical error 
adjustment to final 
account 
      
OH&P £20,581 £20,256 £2426 £22,683 10.21%  
 £294,995 £290,339 £8458 £298,797 1.29% As discussed above 
Table 7. Summary of statistical data following t-test. 
Statistic Result 
Mean Difference £152 
Standard Deviation of Difference £1549 
Standard Error of Difference £323 
½ T alpha 95% Confidence interval 2.06 
Lower Confidence Interval −£487 
Upper Confidence Interval £791 
The data show with 95% confidence that the mean difference between the agreed 
final account (actual cost) and the contract sum (anticipated cost) is a mere GBP 152. This 
result suggests that cost certainty was achieved. The mean percentage error (MPE) and 
mean absolute percentage error (MAPE) were then calculated in order to provide com-
parison between the anticipated and the actual costs of the various elements of the works. 
For a comparison of actual versus anticipated costs, all “new entry” data items were omit-
ted. To prevent the data from being skewed, the interquartile range (IQR = upper quartile 
(Q3)–lower quartile (Q1)) was calculated and an outlier test was completed using the fol-
lowing formula: 
High-value outlier = Q3 + 1.5 (IQR); (1)
therefore, 18.57% + 1.5 (18.57%) = 46.43% 
Low-value outlier = Q1 − 1.5 (IQR); (2)
therefore, 0.00% −1.5(18.57%) = − 27.86% 
The following outliers were identified and removed: 4. FF&E 62.5% (mean absolute 
percentage error (MAPE)); 5.11 Lightning Protection 100% (MAPE); 8.3 Soft Landscaping 
360.2% (MAPE); 8.4 Fencing, Railings, and Walls 2080% (MAPE). Refer to Table 8 for the 
data for the outlier, MPE, and MAPE calculations. 
Table 8. Outlier, MPE, and MAPE data. 
DESCRIPTION 










Total    
Prelims: Fixed £12,215 £12,215 £0 £12,215 0.00% 0.00%  
Prelims: Time Related £29,628 £29,628 £0 £29,628 0.00% 0.00%  
0. Facilitating works £3742 £3742 £0 £3742 0.00% 0.00%  
2.1 Structural Frame £1500 £1500 £0 £1500 0.00% 0.00%  
5.14 BWIC £1000 £1000 £0 £1000 0.00% 0.00%  
8.7 External Services £3825 £3825 £0 £3825 0.00% 0.00% Q1 
2.5 External Walls £15,757 £15,757 £138 £15,895 0.88% 0.88%  
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2.3 Roof Structure £30,389 £30,389 £282 £30,671 0.93% 0.93%  
2.7 Internal Walls & Par-
titions 
£22,386 £22,146 £20 £22,166 −0.98% 0.98%  
3.2 Floor Finishes £1310 £1060 £220 £1280 −2.29% 2.29%  
2.6 Windows & External 
Doors 
£27,994 £27,994 £1148 £29,142 4.10% 4.10%  
8.2 Roads, Paths, Pav-
ing’s & 
       
Surfacing’s £8760 £8010 £1120 £9130 4.22% 4.22% Mid-Point 
8.6 External Drainage £9593 £9593 £450 £10,043 4.69% 4.69%  
3.3 Ceiling Finishes £11,237 £10,662 £0 £10,662 −5.12% 5.12%  
5.1 M&E £54,859 £54,859 £3633 £58,492 6.62% 6.62%  
OH&P £20,581 £20,285 £2426 £22,712 10.35% 10.35%  
1. Substructure £30,730 £29,100 −£3855 £25,245 −17.85% 17.85%  
2.8 Internal Doors (Join-
ery) 
£2159 £2159 £401 £2560 18.57% 18.57% Q3 
3.1 Wall Finishes £5850 £5850 −£1240 £4610 −21.20% 21.20%  





£500 £0 £0 £0 −100.00% 100.00% 
Outlier re-
moved 
8.3 Soft Landscaping £500 £500 £1801 £2301 360.20% 360.20% 
Outlier re-
moved 
8.4 Fencing, Railings & 
Walls 
£80 £80 £1664 £1744 2080.00% 2080.00% 
Outlier re-
moved 









where n = the number of elements of the construction works; and ∑   
       
  
 = the sum of 
the percentage errors. MPE = 
   %
  








where n = the number of elements of the construction works; and ∑  
     
  
       = the sum 
of the absolute percentage errors. MAPE = 
 
  
   97.80; therefore, MAPE = 5.15%. 
These results support the findings of the cross-sectional time horizon and the t-test. 
The final account was in line with the estimated costs and, on average, a 5.15% change to 
the package value was expected, while the average change in each element of the con-
struction works was 0.15%, considering both positive and negative changes. 
7.3. Longitudinal Time Horizon (Based on Table 3) 
The longitudinal time horizon was modelled using bivariate regression, in order to 
show the cumulative cost growth for each application for payment [111]. For the case study 
project, the independent variable was the application for payment (with each application 
equidistant at 2-week intervals), and the dependant variable was the cumulative cost 
growth. The regression module utilises the formula: 
Y = a + bx (5)
where Y is the dependent variable (i.e., cumulative growth); a is the Y-axis intercept; and 
bx is the gradient of the independent variable (i.e., application number). The cumulative 
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cost growth at each application for payment was plotted along with the contract sum, in 
order to provide a benchmark from which to ascertain the point at which the actual cost 
exceeded the anticipated cost (Figure 6a). 
 
(a) 




Figure 6. (a) Longitudinal time horizon; (b) longitudinal time horizon excluding additional work. 
The result produced a formula of: Y = −16,191 + 23,620x. This indicates that before an 
application for payment was made the cumulative cost growth is estimated at GBP −16,191. 
For the case study project, at the point x = 0, Y will also equal zero, as no work on site 
has been done. 
The negative figure may represent the pre-construction and site setup costs incurred 
by the contractor, which will not be paid for until Application 1. The equation also estimates 
that for each additional application for payment the cumulative cost will increase by GBP 
23,620 on average. Model accuracy was also tested using the root-mean-square error 
(RMSE) calculation, as shown in Equation (6): 
RMSEfo = [∑      −     
 
/  /        (6)
where ∑ = summation; (zfi − zoi)2 = differences squared; and n = sample size. This value 
came to GBP 16,654.26, which is incredibly small in comparison to the overall costs in-
volved in the project, and demonstrates a good cost fit for the model. 
The results also produced an R2 of 0.9771, showing an extremely strong relationship 
between the cumulative cost increase and the bimonthly applications. The cumulative cost 
(actual) exceeded the contract sum (anticipated) during Application 13 of 16, and contin-
ued to rise until Application 15 before falling during Application 16—where Applications 
15 and 16 represent the final account ”application” and the ”agreed” final account, respec-
tively. Application 15 therefore represents what the contractor requested from the client, 
Application 16 represents what was agreed. The decline between Applications 15 and 16 
reflects the final account negotiations, with Application 15 representing the contractor’s 
final account submission at GBP 330,319, and Application 16 showing the agreed final 
account at GBP 325,118 (a reduction of GBP 5201). The final account exceeded the contract 
sum by 10.21% due to the cumulative effects of the reasons for change (Table 5). 
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7.4. Longitudinal Time Horizon (Based on Table 4) 
A second longitudinal time horizon was conducted excluding the “Additional 
Work”, based on Table 4. This allowed analysis of the data without their being skewed by 
items that were not considered when the contract was agreed (Figure 6b). 
The result produced a formula of: Y = −8104.60 + 21,830x. This indicates that before 
an application for payment was made the cumulative cost growth was estimated at GBP 
–8104.60. Again, when x = 0, Y will also equal 0 due to no work having been completed on 
site. The RMSE grew slightly to GBP 19,427.59 but, again, this figure is incredibly small 
compared to the overall project costs involved—again demonstrating a good cost fit for 
the model. However, the equation estimates that for each additional application for pay-
ment, the cumulative cost will increase by GBP 21,830 on average. With an R2 of 0.9641, 
an extremely strong relationship between the cumulative cost increase and the bimonthly 
applications is evident. The cumulative cost (actual) exceeded the contract sum (antici-
pated) during Application 14 of 16. The cumulative cost continued to rise in Application 
15 and then fell during Application 16, reflecting the contractor’s final account submis-
sions and the agreed final account. The final account exceeded the contract sum by 1.29%, 
the reasons for which are explained in Table 6. This small increase in the contract sum 
suggests that cost certainty had been achieved. Figure 6b provides a visual aid showing 
the actual costs as marginally higher than the anticipated costs. Comparing Figure 6a with 
Figure 6b, the gap between the cumulative cost and the contract sum is much greater in 
Figure 6a than Figure 6b. 
8. Focus Group Discussion 
A focus group session was established to discuss the analysis results with the three 
members of the project management team. A Microsoft PowerPoint presentation sum-
mary of the literature review and data analysis was delivered by the lead researcher. A 
series of investigative open questions were then delivered to the group (except for partic-
ipant B, who provided responses via e-mail); the questions posed are detailed in Table 9. 
The first three questions investigated tendering and procurement generally. Unani-
mously, participants agreed that the main factor for contractor selection is “cheapest price”, 
with participant A suggesting “9 times out of 10 you will be driven by the costs” and participant 
B simply stating “price.” When prompted on other factors, such as the scope of works, par-
ticipant A confirmed that the price took precedence over this, saying “unfortunately they go 
straight to the bottom line and will make a decision to interview on that basis. It doesn’t always 
mean that’s the result when you have finished the post tender/pre-contract negotiation.” This 
point is supported by previous studies, which found that the lowest price gets called to 
interview [12], that the bottom line is considered more than the scope of works [17], and 
that the price increases during the pre-contract negotiations [19]. 
Table 9. Focus group questions. 
No. Question Prompts 
1 
 Based on your experience of ten-
dering for work, what is the key 
determining factor for contractor 
selection? 
 Price? 
 Understanding of the scope of works? Qualifications and clari-
fications? 
 Previous experience? 
2 
 Of the tenders you have been in-
volved in, what is the most fre-
quently used procurement route? 
 And why do you think this is? 
 Traditional? Design and build? Construction Management / 
Management Contracting? IPD? 
 Cost certainty? Ease of levelling bids? Design and construction 
occur at the same time? Off load risk? Competence / incompe-
tence of design team? 
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3 
 During a competitively tendered 
project what strategies do you im-
plement in order to increase the 
chances of being consider for the 
post tender Q&A process? 
 Exclusions and clarifications to lower the overall tender sum? 
 Can provisional and prime cost sums be used strategically 
during the tender process? 
 How can ambiguity in the scope of works/design be used tac-
tically to improve your position? 
 Raise TQ’s and communication with client team? Examples? 
4 
 Based on your involvement in the 
case study project – what impact 
if any did the negotiated procure-
ment route have on the project de-
livery phase? 
 Communication? 
 Open book approach to variations? Contract/client relation-
ship? 
 Project success – time cost and quality 
5 
 Excluding the additional work 
outside of the contract scope of 
works. The cross-sectional time 
horizon shows the contract sum 
increased by 1.29% to the final ac-
count. What influence did the ne-
gotiated procurement route and 
the contractor/client relationship 
have on this? 
 Open book environment Cost certainty 
 No need to use variations to increase final account to true 
value of the works? 
 Scope of works correctly allowed for at tender stage? Profita-
ble job from outset? 
6 
 Various elements of construction 
work saw percentage reductions 
from the contract sum to the final 
account. Why was this? 
 Omission from the scope of works? Provisional sum expendi-
ture? 
 Procurement route influence (project already profitable)? 
 Honest approach - win / win situation? 
7 
 The large value variations have 
been classified as additional 
works. Why were these items not 
allowed for at tender stage? 
 Not included in scope of works? Client request / Change? 
 Excluded as the scope was ambiguous? 
8 
 Would you class the project deliv-




 Client satisfaction? Profitability? 
9 
 What impact did the negotiated 
procurement route have on this? 
 Communication? Open book? 
Collaboration? Certainty for all parties?To test the hypothesis that the UK construc-
tion industry prefers competitively tendered design and build projects (as stated in the 
literature), a question was posed in order to ascertain the most frequently experienced 
forms of contracts. Participant A responded, “single-staged competitively tendered D&B”, par-
ticipant B said “design and build”, and participant C said “more recently most of the projects 
have been design and build.” This reinforces the findings of the NBS surveys [35–37]. Partic-
ipant B suggested the reason being “there is a perception that the contractor takes all the risk 
(although this is a misconception)”, while participant A continued this discussion, suggest-
ing that the client uses D&B to protect their position, as it becomes the contractor’s re-
sponsibility to “prove change is due to a lack of information, part of the clarifications or a client-
changed requirement.” They continued to say “traditional-type contracts seem to have gone by 
the wayside.” 
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The conversation continued to discuss strategies implemented during the tender pro-
cess to improve the chances of being called for a post-tender interview. Participant A 
stated “price what you see”, however, if it is unclear, you can “put in a different figure, move 
figures below the line or try and reduce the cost.” Participant B added “exclusions and clar-
ifications are always a good way to lower the price and make it more attractive.” This discourse 
concurs with Okada et al. [44], who found that contractors implement strategies to submit 
an artificially low price, which will inevitably result in changes to the contract sum to 
reflect the true scope of the works [45]. At this point, the discussion began to explore ne-
gotiation, and participant A suggested “the figures tend to be more aligned at the end of 
the job, than during a competitively tendered, all-risk D&B”, therefore supporting the data 
analysis showing that cost certainty was achieved. 
At this point, the conversation was directed towards the case study project. A ques-
tion was posed regarding the impact of the negotiated procurement route on the project 
delivery. Key words and phrases from the participants included: “communication”, “close 
working relationships”, “early contractor–client relationships”, and “clearly defined scope of 
work.” Consequently, once the works commenced on site, the project delivery was rela-
tively easy, as there was minimal “ambiguity” and, therefore, the site only encountered 
“minor changes but nothing of great consequence” as described by participant C. Various ele-
ments of the construction work saw a reduction from the contract sum to the final account. 
Participants agreed that one contributing factor was that the project was set up well at the 
start and, therefore, the contractor was able to reimburse costs that were not expended 
vis-à-vis holding onto them. Participant A described the relationship as a “collaborative 
relationship as opposed to the aggressive type of situation you sometimes find”, and participant B 
agreed the relationships led to an “honest approach.” 
When discussing the reasons for change, participant A said “a lot of the changes were 
due to additional works the client decided he wanted”, and participant B agreed that change 
was largely due to “client request.” This supports the data analysis, as 20 of the 39 varia-
tions had been classified as client-driven. Participants agreed that the established relation-
ships allowed management of change to be more “informal”, which helped in maintaining 
good working relationships. Due to the proximity of the site to the client’s residence, par-
ticipant A suggested “it could have been a monumental disaster having the client that close to site 
because he would be there every day wanting to change or tweak things, but it worked out alright 
in the end.” 
Upon discussion of the success of the project delivery, participant A said, “it was de-
livered well, the client was very happy, and the product is exactly what he wanted so from 
that perspective it was extremely successful.” From a site perspective, participant C also 
deemed the project to be successful; “it finished well, and the client was over the moon with 
it.” The scope of the works was clearly defined and, therefore, any ambiguity or requests 
for information related to changes were as described by participant C, who said “The ma-
jority of RFIs were because we knew there was a variation coming”, and where things were not 
clear “they were very quickly resolved.” Furthermore, participant A said “The majority of 
change was the client requiring extras rather than change because the design was inadequate, or 
things hadn’t been interpreted correctly, or that the tender documents weren’t sufficient.” These 
reasons are supported by Smith et al. [49], Love et al. [112], and Ashworth et al. [67]. In 
addition, the completed project resulted in a recommendation and another negotiated 
project for the contractor. 
9. Discussion 
This research case study has provided a novel insight into an alternative procurement 
route (i.e., the negotiated procurement path) adopted by an SME contractor, thus provid-
ing both theoretical and practical contributions to knowledge and practice. From a theo-
retical perspective, the negotiated procurement created an ”open book” environment that 
fostered trust and good working relationships between the contractor and the client. This 
included good adjudication of tender submissions to facilitate a two-way transparent 
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knowledge transfer between client requirements and construction risks identified by the 
contractor. For example, during the pre-contract phase, the client regularly attended the 
main contractor’s office to review the proposals, including a line-by-line review of the 
scope of the works and the associated costs of each item of work. This contrasts with extant 
literature, which reveals that during a competitive tender period, the contractor’s submis-
sions do not cater for the full scope of works and, consequently, the costs are artificially 
low so as to improve the probability of securing the project. Thereafter, variations during 
the construction phase are used as a tool to bring the project back in line with the scope of 
the works required, whilst also seizing the opportunity to submit manipulated costs in 
order to increase the total cost over and above the actual value of the works. 
From a practical perspective, this research underpins the importance of both clients 
and contractors firmly embedding the attributes of confidence, transparency, and trust in 
a project. All too often, an unnecessarily adversarial relationship transpires, in which both 
client and contractor place their own business priorities ahead of those of the other con-
tract parties. However, by working in harmony with one another, such attributes were 
shown in this case study to better control costs and mitigate disputes for the mutual ben-
efit of both parties. The project provided cost certainty for the client and secured another 
negotiated project for the contractor. Following the presentation of the case study data 
analysis, cost certainty was discussed during the focus group, and participant A stated 
that: “without his changes the contract sum was ultimately almost the finite cost.” Importantly, 
the project did not involve a PQS or third-party cost control operative, but instead the ne-
gotiation was completed between the client and the contractor directly. This proved ben-
eficial to the project, as the client was not subjected to inaccurate early cost advice. Extant 
literature identifies this as a failing of the tender process, as the estimates frequently fail 
to consider site conditions, sequencing, and buildability [49]. Consequently, the client and 
the contractor worked together to develop the scheme to meet the client’s budget, pro-
gramme, and desired end product. A possible difference is that the client was knowledge-
able about construction works, and that it may not be advisable to remove the third-party 
cost control (via a PQS) for less knowledgeable clients. 
This research study has two main limitations: First, the lead researcher and study 
participants worked for the main contractor. Consequently, there is a potential for bias, as 
the opinions and experiences of client-side construction professionals have not been ex-
plored; future work should seek to address this deficiency. In addition, a single case study 
is unable to draw inference to determine whether or not the findings are applicable to 
other similar projects or procurement routes. Future research should therefore seek to run 
a cross-comparative analysis across various projects and procurement paths, in order to 
determine whether the findings presented here are unique or generalizable. 
10. Conclusions 
The literature review and responses from professional practitioners confirm that the 
UK construction industry’s (and those of other nations globally) current preference for 
competitive tendering and design and build fails to procure the most suited contractor to 
complete the project, subsequently leaving the client dissatisfied, the final account not re-
flecting the contract sum, and a vast number of variations. This scenario stems from inac-
curacies in the early cost estimates, design issues, and contractors implementing strategic 
pricing tactics to secure work due to the ”race to the bottom” culture instilled by this in-
dustry preference. Often, the determining factor for project success is based on cost, and 
yet, literature points towards recurrent issues of variations, rework and, ultimately, cost 
inflations [44,58,62]. This case study’s findings (involving an SME contractor) illustrate 
cost certainty being achieved and, therefore, provide a novel alternative procurement 
route centred on relationships, the scope of works, and transparency among stakeholders. 
A number of the design changes took place during the tender period; this was an ad-
vantage of the negotiation, as the contractor was involved early and, therefore, items that 
were foreseen could be dealt with at the tender stage. Therefore, the majority of changes 
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during the construction stage were client-driven variations. Subsequently, the contractor 
understood what the client wanted to achieve, and the client had clear visibility on what 
they were getting. During the focus group, however, it was discussed that early contractor 
engagement is not common enough. In addition, due to the limitations discussed, this 
route of negotiation may not be applicable in all situations. 
In addition to cost certainty, the findings also underscore the client’s satisfaction, due 
to the recommendation for another future project for the SME contractor. Consequently, 
the outcome of the project delivery was mutually beneficial, and provided value to the 
client. Ultimately, the research findings support current literature that has recognised a 
need for change. This research therefore provides a catalyst for further research into the 
failings of competitive tendering, in order to draw inference and produce new guidance 
with the view to making tendering, procurement, and project delivery more efficient.  
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